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Abstract:
Since the 1990s, the literature on External Democracy Promotion (EDP) 
expanded exponentially. Despite widely supported conclusions on EDP 
(in)effectiveness in fostering democratization and preventing democratic 
backsliding are still lacking, this literature have generated sophisticated 
explanations of these processes. Among them, Levitsky and Way’s 
(L&W) linkage and leverage theory stands out as one of the most 
influential. According to Tolstrup, however, their underestimation of 
domestic agency constitutes a crucial lacuna, which he proposes to fill 
through the concept of ‘Gatekeeping Elite’ that underlines a significant 
impact of local actors on the linkage dimension and, consequently, on 
EDP (in)effectiveness. I believe that Tolstrup’s intuition can be further 
developed, expanding even more the explanatory power of L&W’s 
theory. I claim that domestic actors may exert a crucial influence also on 
the leverage dimension, thanks to a set of ‘diversionary behaviours’ that 
local elites may use to change external actors’ interests and preferences, 
persuading them to limit their democratizing pressures and thus 
reducing their own vulnerability to EDP processes. To assess the 
plausibility of this claim, I perform a congruence analysis on the recent 
and crucial case of autocratization in Serbia (EU candidate country), 
which is not fully explained by the aforementioned models.
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External Democracy Promotion in time of Democratic Crisis. 
Linkage, Leverage and Domestic Actors’ Diversionary Behaviours.
Abstract
Since the 1990s, the literature on External Democracy Promotion (EDP) expanded 
exponentially. Despite widely supported conclusions on EDP (in)effectiveness in fostering 
democratization and preventing democratic backsliding are still lacking, this literature 
have generated sophisticated explanations of these processes. Among them, Levitsky 
and Way’s (L&W) linkage and leverage theory stands out as one of the most influential. 
According to Tolstrup, however, their underestimation of domestic agency constitutes a 
crucial lacuna, which he proposes to fill through the concept of ‘Gatekeeping Elite’ that 
underlines a significant impact of local actors on the linkage dimension and, consequently, 
on EDP (in)effectiveness. I believe that Tolstrup’s intuition can be further developed, 
expanding even more the explanatory power of L&W’s theory. I claim that domestic actors 
may exert a crucial influence also on the leverage dimension, thanks to ‘diversionary 
behaviours’ that local elites may use to change external actors’ interests and preferences, 
persuading them to limit their democratizing pressures and thus reducing their own 
vulnerability to EDP processes. To assess the plausibility of this claim, I perform a 
congruence analysis on the recent and crucial case of autocratization in Serbia (EU 
candidate country), which is not fully explained by the aforementioned models.
Key words:
External Democracy promotion, European Union, Linkage/Leverage, Domestic agency, 
Serbia, Vučić.
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Since the end of the Cold War, international actors’ increased dynamism in promoting 
democracy led to an exponential expansion of the literature on External Democracy Promotion 
(EDP). Despite widely supported conclusions on whether and to what extent EDP has been 
successful are still lacking,1 the literature has generated sophisticated explanations of these 
processes. This subject is even more important today, since democratic backsliding has become 
a key challenge:2 hence, EDP needs to be evaluated also on its capacity to prevent 
autocratization.
The literature highlighted the impact of numerous factors on EDP (in)effectiveness: 
power asymmetry, density of ties and geographical proximity between target states and external 
actors;3 black knights;4 lack of domestic pro-democratic elites;5 the democratization-stability 
dilemma influencing external actors’ choices;6 stateness and national identity issues,7 etc.
Still struggling to overcome both structure/agency and international/domestic divides, 
these studies tend also to underestimate the ole of domestic actors in EDP processes, since top-
down approaches treating local elites as passive recipients of external stimuli are still 
dominant.8 Despite recent improvements in the literature, domestic actors’ capacity of 
influencing these processes is still overlooked.9 Hence, what explains EDP (in)effectiveness? 
Are domestic actors able to play an active and significant role in these processes?
Levitsky and Way’s10 (L&W) linkage and leverage theory is among the most influential 
attempts to explain EDP (in)effectiveness, since it considers both external/domestic and 
agency/structure factors. According to them, the impact of the international dimension on 
democracy operates along the two dimensions of linkage and leverage, which are indeed 
efficacious in explaining cross-national variations in EDP effectiveness. According to 
Tolstrup11 this theory is incomplete since it fails to account for intra-regional variance among 
cases subjected to the same structural environment, due to its underestimation of domestic 
agency. With the concept of ‘gatekeeping elites,’ Tolstrup expands the explanatory power of 
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the linkage and leverage theory by showing how local players may significantly influence EDP 
effectiveness thanks to their capacity of altering the linkage dimension. While I share most of 
Tolstrup’ findings, I believe that he fails to fully exploit his intuition, since he focuses only on 
the linkage dimension, overlooking Western leverage. Moreover, Tolstrup does not explain 
those puzzling cases in which EDP is ineffective despite high, or even increasing, levels of 
linkage to the West.
To fill this lacuna, I focus on the impact of local elites on Western leverage, which may 
result from ‘diversionary behaviours’ able to persuade external actors to alter their 
democratizing pressures. In this way, local elites may exert a significant impact on EDP 
(in)effectiveness.
To assess the plausibility of this claim, I perform a congruence analysis12 on the crucial 
case of Serbia. According to both L&W and Tolstrup EDP should have been effective in this 
country, since Serbia has enjoyed a high level of both linkage and leverage13 and its linkage to 
the EU has even increased during the last decade.14 However, Serbia’s recent autocratization 
shows EDP ineffectiveness, which represents a puzzling outcome:15 neither the gatekeeping 
function performed by domestic elites (Tolstrup) nor the structural factors identified by L&W 
appear to explain completely this puzzle. The impact of domestic elites’ diversionary 
behaviours may help account for EDP ineffectiveness in the Serbian Case, expanding in this 
way the explanatory power of the linkage and leverage theory and supporting the claim that 
local agency deserves greater attention in EDP processes.
Explaining External Democracy Promotion: A Selective Overview of the 
Literature
In this article EDP (in)effectiveness is intended in basic terms. Given the presence of an external 
actor officially committed to foster democratization, or prevent autocratization, in a target state, 
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the efficacy of these processes is evaluated according to the variations in the level of democracy 
provided by internationally renowned democracy indexes.
To explain EDP (in)effectiveness the literature focused on structure-related factors, 
stressing the role of international variables16 such as power asymmetry, density of ties and 
geographical proximity between target states and external actors: the stronger, closer and more 
connected the letter are to the former the greater their capacity of fostering the 
establishment/consolidation/resilience of democracy.17 These approaches explain well inter-
regional differences in EDP effectiveness. However, they appear excessively deterministic (all 
cases subjected to similar structural constraints will inevitably follow the same path), and 
inclined to underestimate agency-related factors in general, and domestic actors in particular. 
In turn, these weaknesses make them less able to explain intra-regional differences related to 
cases that do not adhere to the regional pattern.18
Other approaches consider agency-related factors, which focus on domestic and 
international actors’ influences on EDP (in)effectiveness: determinacy/credibility of EU 
conditionality, and domestic adoption costs;19 black knights;20 democratization-stability 
dilemma influencing external actors’ choices;21 strong local pro-democratic elites;22 powerful 
domestic anti-democratic players.23 Despite its noteworthy contribution, this literature does not 
offer parsimonious explanations of inter-regional differences in EDP efficacy24 and 
undervalues domestic elites, privileging international actors;25 even when local players’ 
relevance is acknowledged top-down approaches picturing them as passive recipient merely 
reacting to external actors’ opportunities/constraints are adopted.26
L&W’s linkage and leverage theory27 is among the most influential attempts to explain 
EDP (in)effectiveness since it considers both external/domestic and structure/agency-related 
factors.28 According to L&W, two dimensions are crucial: linkages (the density of ties between 
the external actor and the targeted state) and leverage (the vulnerability of targeted states to 
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external pressures). As Table 1 shows, EDP effectiveness is maximized when both linkage and 
leverage are high: democracy should be the outcome even in the absence of favourable domestic 
conditions. The other cases highlight a declining EDP effectiveness and a growing influence of 
domestic structural factors on regime outcomes.
(TABLE 1 NEAR HERE)
Despite L&W provide a more elegant and far-reaching explanation of Western 
democracy promotion than many other theorists, they end up stressing the dominant impact of 
structure-related factors: in fact, they put more emphasis on the linkage dimension, claiming 
that a dense set of linkages is a crucial condition to convert leverage into influence. Hence, their 
model presents shortcomings similar to those highlighted for structuralist approaches, 
particularly the undervaluation of domestic agency.
Tolstrup’s concept of ‘gatekeeping elite’29 represents an effective way to deal with this 
lacuna since it brings agency back into L&W’s theory, successfully strengthening its 
explanatory power. According to L&W, structural factors like geography or history determine 
the density of linkages. Tolstrup challenges this idea, claiming that domestic elites perform a 
gatekeeping function through which they condition the level of linkages generated by structural 
factors and independently develop linkages to external actors. Gatekeeping elites are thus able 
to initiates, develops, and attempts to reduce ties with international actors, influencing in this 
way the level of linkages and EDP (in)effectiveness. Thus, Tolstrup can account for the 
different impact of EDP in Belarus and Ukraine, which the original model fails to explain.
Despite his brilliant contribution, I claim that Tolstrup does not exploit fully his 
intuition. Dealing only with the impact of domestic agency on linkage, Tolstrup’s argument 
seems to suffer paradoxically from a structuralist bias since linkage is considered always as the 
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dominant dimension explaining EDP (in)effectiveness: domestic elites that aim at interfering 
with the external capacity of influence have to do it indirectly, by tuning up or down their 
linkages with external actors. However, we should acknowledge also the possibility that 
domestic elites may affect more directly international actors’ capacity of influence on target 
states. Moreover, while Tolstrup re-elaborates L&W’s theory to account also for cases of 
external autocracy promotion, he does not consider the consolidating phenomenon of 
democratic backsliding: in fact, both approaches focus on the determinants of EDP 
(in)effectiveness in transition politics, disregarding cases of (lack of) democratic resilience and 
the role that EDP actors play in these processes.
My aim here is to build upon Tolstrup’s intuition to bring agency back into L&W’s 
theory. To explicate EDP (in)effectiveness and, in particular, domestic actors’ impact on it, I 
claim that next to L&W’s structural factors and Tolstrup’s gatekeeping elites, we need to focus 
also on local actors’ capacity of manipulating the leverage dimension through the adoption of 
diversionary behaviours. Hence, a closer look at this dimension is needed.
L&W’s30 conceptualization of Western leverage refers to a country’s vulnerability to 
external pressures, which regards both the bargaining power a state possesses in relation to the 
West and the potential impact of Western pressures or how harmful they can be for targeted 
states. L&W identify three factors influencing leverage: 1) size and strength of a country’s state 
and economy (power asymmetry): Western pressures are less effective in structurally strong 
states; 2) competing Western foreign-policy objectives, or a sort of democratization-stability 
dilemma influencing external actors’ choices: a state’s vulnerability is lower when the presence 
of stability/security issues persuades Western actors to apply weaker democratizing pressures; 
3) black knights: foreign powers counterbalancing Western pressures through 
economic/military/diplomatic aid may decrease the target state’s vulnerability to EDP.
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Despite Western leverage appears to deal with domestic agency since it regards the 
bargaining power of target states and their vulnerability to external pressures, the way it is 
measured by L&W31 (Table 2) demonstrates that the real focus is on structural factors and 
international agency. In fact, strong power asymmetry is the only factor capable of determining 
a low leverage, and a consequent negative impact on EDP effectiveness, while the two factors 
regarding international agency (competing foreign-policy objectives and black knights) can, at 
most, determine a medium leverage and a slightly weaker impact on EDP effectiveness with 
respect to high leverage.
(TABLE 2 NEAR HERE)
If we add that even international agency factors influencing the level of leverage are 
operationalized mostly in structural terms, we can acknowledge the limited impact of agency-
related factors on L&W’s leverage. Moreover, the authors consider this dimension as 
unidirectional, treating domestic elites as passive recipients of external actors’ demands for 
change and, hence, undervaluing their capacity of influencing leverage and EDP processes. My 
claim is that domestic actors may have an impact on these processes not only performing a 
gatekeeping function on linkage (Tolstrup) but also through diversionary behaviours aiming at 
influencing leverage.
More Agency in the Linkage and Leverage Theory: Domestic Actors’ 
Diversionary Behaviours
The concept of ‘diversionary war,’ elaborated in the field of international relations,32 highlights 
how leaders may use militarized force abroad to distract their publics from domestic issues and 
regain their support thanks to a rally-around-the-flag effect. The key aspects of this concept 
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8
regard a specific action adopted to deflect attention from some kinds of issues and secure the 
support of various kinds of actors. Adapting this logic to my subject, I suggest that domestic 
leaders will engage in some kind of behaviour intended to distract EDP actors from issues in 
the establishment/consolidation/resilience of democratic institutions, and secure their 
support/legitimation. More specifically, domestic elites may use diversionary behaviours in 
their interactions with international actors, aiming at manipulating the latter’ interests and 
perceptions, and persuading them to reduce their democratizing pressures: this will, in turn, 
lower the level of leverage with a possibly relevant impact on EDP effectiveness. We should 
also acknowledge that some forms of diversionary behaviour may be used to strengthen 
democratization processes locking countries in democratic clubs (i.e. the Baltic States and the 
EU). However, we are going to focus on the opposite path which appears to be far more 
common. 
How diversionary behaviours affect the factors determining the level of Western 
leverage? While structural limits make domestic elites unable to influence power asymmetry 
(first factor), and Tolstrup already showed how local actors may enhance their linkages with 
black knights (third factor), competing foreign-policy objectives (second factor) may be heavily 
influenced by domestic leaders’ diversions. According to L&W, only structural factors (i.e. 
economic/strategic relevance of targeted states) may generate competing foreign-policy issues 
able to persuade external actors to avoid/limit democratizing pressures on target states. Since 
the dominant logic behind this factor regards external actors’ perceptions about the convenience 
of exerting democratizing pressures, I propose an extensive interpretation of the causes leading 
to this outcome (Figure 1). A significant impact on external actors’ perceptions may emerge 
not only from ‘real’ (L&W) but also from ‘potential’ competing foreign-policy objectives: 
domestic elites’ diversionary behaviours, manipulating external actors’ perceptions with 
respect to the ‘potential’ relevance of security issues, may be equally effective in persuading 
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9
international actors to limit their democratizing pressures. In what fallows, I will focus on two 
types of diversionary behaviour, which does not exclude that other kind of strategies following 
the same logic may be adopted by domestic actors.
(FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE)
The first diversionary behaviour may be labelled ‘crisis management.’33 Here, I refer to 
domestic elites that provoke/manufacture/induce crises they can solve when necessary: for 
example, triggering and successively de-escalating interethnic violence or tension with 
neighbouring countries may signal to EDP actors the risk of stability/security issues and, at the 
same time, highlight the positive role of governing elites as stability providers. Moreover, the 
same goal can be reached exploiting genuine crises and managing them in a way that enhance 
domestic elites’ bargaining power vis-à-vis EDP actors. In short, domestic leaders have to deal 
with the paradox of generating frequent suspensions of ordinary politics through the 
manufacturing/exploitation of crises while not losing their image of stability providers. The 
successful establishment of this delicate equilibrium may produces the same impact of genuine 
security/stability issues in the perceptions of external actors, with the identical outcome of 
persuading them to limit their democratizing pressures and thus reduce EDP effectiveness. This 
type of strategy is not new and has characterized Western support for non-democratic regimes 
around the world for decades.34 However, it is puzzling in EU candidate countries in which an 
external actor officially devoted to democracy promotion may end up providing a crucial 
legitimation to domestic elites that actually jeopardize the democratization process.35
The second diversion regards the ‘instrumentalization of black knights,’ which goes 
beyond both the actual support provided by counter-hegemonic powers to target states (L&W), 
and the massive strengthening of linkages to these actors by domestic elites (Tolstrup). For 
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example, threating to increase their relations with black knights may already help reducing 
domestic actors’ vulnerability to external pressures. Moreover, a slight increase of these 
linkages, which does not reach the needed magnitude to produce the counterbalancing effect 
suggested by L&W (at least 1% of GDP) and Tolstrup (to be evaluated case by case in 
comparative terms), may pursue the symbolic goal of showing to external actors the risk of an 
emerging security issue, which may moderate EDP pressures. Furthermore, domestic actors 
may claim to be victims of counter-hegemonic powers’ manoeuvrings, leading the West to 
show support for governing elite and downplay democratizing pressures.36
Since we are focusing on outcomes influenced by strategies that work on external actors’ 
perceptions, we should stress that other actions adopted by domestic elites may have an impact 
of some relevance: however, this would be an indirect influence, a side-effect, if compared with 
the two diversionary behaviours presented above. An example comes from the Europeanization 
literature regarding partial/selective/fake/pathological compliance of local elites with external 
demands,37 which appeases international actors without producing changes that are sufficiently 
meaningful or go in the right direction: the goal is to manipulate external actors’ perceptions 
signalling domestic elites’ good will, which may have as a side-effect to limit their 
democratizing pressures.
Although the main goal of this paper is to stress that domestic agency may influence 
EDP effectiveness not only through gatekeeping (Tolstrup) but also with diversionary 
behaviors, we need to at least address the next question in the causal chain: what factors 
favor/hinder the capacity of domestic actors’ diversionary behaviors to influence EDP 
effectiveness? In what follows, I will touch upon three factors and try to elaborate some 
provisional hypotheses, warning that other researches are needed to reach more solid 
conclusions.
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First, we have to focus on ‘starting conditions,’ assessing the role of L&W’ structural 
factors, according to which only the evident economic/strategic relevance of a state (i.e. Russia, 
Saudi Arabia) generates credible competing foreign-policy objectives able to persuade EDP 
actors to limit their democratizing pressures. However, there are scenarios in which some kind 
of structural factors exist but they are not objectively sufficient to produce a significant impact 
on the security/democratization dilemma of EDP actors: while L&W’s interpretation regards 
conditions that are already in place these scenarios may refer, for example, to credible 
security/stability crises that may or may not emerge, according to the behavior of involved 
actors. In these cases, domestic elites may adopt diversions to increase the credibility of 
structural factors. Hence, we may attempt to propose the following hypothesis: diversionary 
behaviors will beare more likely to be more effective in influencing EDP processes when they 
can build upon something real, like an old inter-state war that can be restarted, a migration wave 
that can be unleashed, the existence of a fo eign power capable and willing to perform a black 
knight function, etc. Using the same logic, it is quite unlikely to instrumentalize black knights 
if a foreign power with the features/willingness to perform a black knight function is not 
present.
The second factor is related to the ‘type and strength of domestic actors.’ It is more 
likely to have effective diversions when ruling elites are the dominant actor in their socio-
political system, because of the greater control they can exert on state resources and apparatus, 
the stronger capacity to involve the population in support of their strategies, the lack of domestic 
alternatives for international actors, etc. Stronger ruling elites are better equipped to show EDP 
actors unity, capacity to act and momentum, which may be crucial for the credibility of 
diversionary behaviors. In terms of type, according to their commitment to democracy I 
distinguish three groups of domestic actors: democratic resisters, instrumental democrats, and 
full democrats. While the features of the first and the last type are intuitive, instrumental 
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democrats represent actors that do not formally contest democracy but operate to hollow it 
informally/gradually. I claim that instrumental democrats are better equipped to implement 
more effective diversionary behaviors, because less likely to trigger a strong reaction from EDP 
actors, as it would be for democratic resisters, and more willing to implement diversions if 
compared to full democrats. Hence, the following hypothesis may be formulated: diversionary 
behaviors are more likely to be effective when implemented by strong instrumental democrats.
A third factor regards a possible ‘weakness of EDP actors.’ Here, I do not refer to 
fundamental changes in the power asymmetry between EDP actors and target states; rather, 
there are phenomena that may weaken/distract international actors (i.e. an intense economic 
crisis), influencing their determination in pursuing EDP processes. Such situations may make 
diversions more effective since international actors could be less willing to take even the risk 
of allowing yet another problem to emerge. A final hypothesis, thus, emerges: diversionary 
behaviors have more chances to be effective when EDP actors are weakened or distracted by 
other issues. 
To resumeconclude, strong instrumental democrats, building on favorable starting 
conditions and dealing with weakened international actors, will have more chances to put in 
place credible diversionary behaviors, with a greater impact on the security/democratization 
dilemma, the leverage dimension and EDP effectiveness.
To assess the plausibility of this proposal, I adopt the congruence analysis method.38 
This approach aims at linking empirical observations back to a more abstract theoretical 
framework, with the goal of evaluating its explanatory powers vis-à-vis other competing 
frameworks. The selection of Serbia is perfectly congruent with this methodological approach. 
In fact, case selection for congruence analysis does not look for variation among or within cases; 
it is, instead, theory-driven, and it suggests to select crucial cases that are expected to conform 
to the dominant theory.39 I maintain that Serbia is relevant as a case study for several reasons. 
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From a theoretical perspective, Serbia, according to L&W’s theory and analysis,40 is a most 
likely case of effective EDP since it enjoyed a high level of linkage and leverage: hence, 
external democracy promoters should be able to foster the establishment/resilience of 
democratic institutions even in presence of unfavourable domestic conditions, implying that 
local elites are barely relevant. However, Serbia recently autocratized,41 showing how the EDP 
was ineffective. Moreover, according to Tolstrup this EDP failure should be the result of local 
elites tuning down linkages to the West. However, the Serbian elite managed to increase the 
already high linkage with the EU. Hence, Serbia appears to contradict, at least in part, both 
L&W and Tolstrup’ assumptions/predictions regarding the determinants of EDP 
(in)effectiveness. From a practical point of view, Serbia is a frontrunner among the current EU 
candidate countries and intrinsically relevant due to its key role for the stability of the Balkans.42
EU Democracy Promotion and Serbia’s Autocratization: Diversions at 
Work
The purpose of this section is to offer a selective overview of EDP in Serbia and exemplify the 
important role domestic actors’ diversionary behaviors may have in influencing EDP 
effectiveness, not to thoroughly analyze the trajectory of Serbian democratization, nor to fully 
explain its autocratization process.
Slobodan Milošević and his Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije, SPS) 
dominated Serbian politics during the 1990s, establishing a Competitive Authoritarian (CA) 
regime thanks also to little Western pressures, originated from Milošević’s perceived utility in 
solving the Balkan wars, which led to a temporarily ineffective EDP.43 
The Kosovo war (1998-99) led Western powers to exert an enormous pressure on 
Milošević, through direct military intervention (1999) and constant support to Serbian 
oppositions, which were persuaded to merge into the Democratic Opposition of Serbia 
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(Demokratska opozicija Srbije, DOS). Consequently, DOS won the 2000 elections with its most 
representative leaders becoming President of the Republic (Vojislav Koštunica, Democratic 
Party of Serbia, Demokratska stranka Srbije, DSS) and Prime Minister (Zoran Đinđić, 
Democratic Party, Demokratska stranka, DS).44
During the 2000s, several DOS governments struggled only to establish a defective 
democracy in Serbia. This fragile political system survived under the threat of Vojislav Šešelj’s 
far-right Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka, SRS), which became the largest 
party in Serbia, and led Western pressures to be consistent throughout the 2000s. Since the 
Zagreb European council (2000), Serbia has been involved in the EU integration process. The 
negotiation for the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) started in 2005 but were 
called off in 2006 due to Serbia’s lack of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal 
of Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Fearing that the country might turn to extremist platforms (i.e. 
SRS), the EU in concomitance with the 2007 parliamentary elections assured that SAA 
negotiations would be resumed after the new government was formed, which was actually done 
without any concrete change in Serbia’s attitude toward the ICTY. To favour the re-election of 
the pro-EU president Boris Tadić (DS) in the 2008 presidential elections, the European 
Commission announced in November 2007 the finalization of the SAA. With the same goal of 
boosting the electoral chances of pro-EU parties, just few weeks before the 2008 parliamentary 
elections the EU signed the SAA with Serbia.45 With the arrest in 2011 of the last war criminals 
Mladić and Hadzic, the cooperation with the ICTY lost its influence on Serbia-EU relations. 
Hence, Kosovo surged as the major issue in this process, even more so due to its 2008 unilateral 
declaration of independence. In fact, the next key step of the Serbian integration process 
(candidate status) was granted to reward the DS government, which had agreed to participate 
in the EU-sponsored dialogue process with Kosovo authorities and had promised to allow its 
former province to participate in regional organizations.46 Moreover, this reward came again 
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just few months before the 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections, presumably with the 
intent to boost the electoral chances of pro-EU parties.
After his defeat in the 2008 presidential elections, the SRS leader Tomislav Nikolić left 
his party and founded the formally more moderate and pro-EU Serbian Progressive Party 
(Srpska napredna stranka, SNS).47 Thanks also to this change, Nikolić won the 2012 
presidential elections and Aleksandar Vučić, the new SNS leader, became vice-prime minister 
through a post-electoral coalition with the SPS. Hence, former Milošević’s associates were back 
in power.48 Despite the fears of many in the EU, this government committed itself to EU 
accession and the normalization of relations with Kosovo. In fact, in 2012 Ivica Dačić became 
the first Serbian prime minister to meet with its Kosovan counterpart Hashim Thaci. Moreover, 
in 2013 Serbia and Kosovo signed an historic agreement, the ‘First (Brussels) Agreement,’ 
which outlined the trajectory of future negotiations.49 Serbia was rewarded with the official 
start of membership negotiations in 2014.50
Snap elections called in 2014 recorded the definitive collapse of former ruling parties 
(i.e. DS, DSS) and the fragmentation of the opposition, giving the SNS-SPS coalition the largest 
parliamentary majority in Serbian history (eighty percent).51 Vučić became prime minister, also 
winning the 2016 elections and becoming President of the Republic in 2017.52 Since the starting 
of membership negotiations, Serbia was rewarded with the opening of sixteen out of thirty-five 
chapters, with two of them provisionally closed. Chapter 35 on ‘other issues,’ which included 
the normalization of Serbia-Kosovo relations, was the first to be opened on 14 December 2015, 
clearly highlighting how this issue was the top EU priority. Today, Serbia is the frontrunner 
among the EU candidate countries, as explicitly stated by the former Commission President 
Jean-Claude Junker, which in November 2017 declared the following: “I really think that Serbia 
and Montenegro will be members of the EU before 2025.”53
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Despite these (slow) progresses, which stress a high and growing level of Serbia-EU 
linkages, the state of democracy in this country is disappointing. As the V-DEM Regime of the 
World Index shows (Figure 2), Serbian democracy fell rapidly back into competitive 
authoritarianism soon after Vučić’s rise to premiership in 2014.54 This decoupling between the 
progresses in the EU integration process and the deterioration of democracy seems sufficient to 
claim that the EU EDP in Serbia was ineffective.
(FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE)
Which factors favoured this EDP failure? Following Tolstrup’s perspective, it should 
have been the result of a significant variation in the linkage dimension, with gatekeeping elites 
reducing ties with the West and increasing them with black knights. However, this explanation 
does not fit with the Serbian case, in which linkages to the West were even strengthened and 
the small improvements in Serbia’s linkages with Russia and China were not of the needed 
magnitude to allow them to perform a meaningful black knight function.
Regarding L&W, their key dimension of linkage is high: their own analysis confirm this 
evaluation until 200855 and the deepening of the accession process briefly touched upon above 
is sufficient to classify the Serbian linkage to the West as high also in the 2010s. Regarding 
Western leverage, L&W’s analysis of this case classify leverage in Serbia as high during the 
2000s.56 However, if competing foreign-policy issues are present their measurement system 
downgrade leverage to a medium level. This appear to be the case in Serbia during the 2010s 
since progresses in the accession process have been granted as rewards for improvements in 
security issues (Kosovo) and despite the evident and parallel erosion of democracy. According 
to L&W, a high level of both linkage and leverage should produce an effective EDP, able to 
bring democratization even in the absence of favourable domestic conditions. Since leverage is 
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medium in Serbia we should have foreseen a moderately effective EDP and a slow but steady 
democratization. Hence, EDP ineffectiveness does not seem to be explained by L&W. I should 
acknowledge that these Authors stress how particularly strong factors may lead to ineffective 
EDP even in presence of other favourable conditions. Serbia during the 1990s provides such an 
example since a temporarily ineffective EDP was generated by competing security issues 
(Milošević’s perceived utility in solving the Balkan wars).57 However, such intense situation 
was absent in Serbia during the 2010s since the considerable improvements in the Kosovo-
Serbia relations had largely softened objective security issues in the region. In conclusion, if 
competing foreign-policy objectives led the EU to favour stability over democratization and, 
thus, contributed to an ineffective EDP, L&W’s structural factors responsible for the emergence 
of this factor (economic/strategic relevance of the target state) do not seem to explain 
completely this outcome.
In what follows, I will argue that diversionary behaviours implemented by Serbian elites 
need to be included among the factors explaining EDP ineffectiveness in this case. Thanks also 
to these behaviours, the new Serbia elite seems to have succeeded in establishing a delicate 
equilibrium in which the EU has been persuaded to accept small and incomplete gains in the 
security dimension (Kosovo) in exchange for improvements in the accession process and a 
blatant disregard for the growing authoritarian tendencies recently emerged in Serbia.
The first diversionary behaviour, labelled ‘crisis management,’58 regards domestic 
leaders establishing a delicate equilibrium between their image of stability providers and the 
need to ensure that there is continued instability so that external actors can be persuaded to 
focus on this issue rather than on democracy erosion. In this regard, Kosovo constitutes a perfect 
example.59 On one hand, the new elite entered into the EU-sponsored dialogue with Kosovan 
authorities, which led to the historic signing of the Brussels Agreement and persuaded the EU 
to consider Vučić as more effective in providing stability if compared with previous pro-EU 
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governments. Symbolic gestures as Vučić’s attendance in Srebrenica in 2015 reinforced his 
image as stability provider.60 On the other hand, the SNS instrumentalized this issue to keep a 
certain level of instability, which helped the ruling party to divert EU’s attention from its 
inaction regarding necessary democratic reforms.61 For example, in 2015 Serbia blocked 
Kosovo from gaining UNESCO membership. Moreover, in 2017 Serbian authorities sent a train 
to northern Kosovo bearing the words ‘Kosovo is Serbia’ in twenty-one languages.62 The train 
was in due time stopped from entering Kosovo by Vučić. This was followed by provocative 
rhetoric from President Nikolić regarding military threat, while Vučić took a more conciliatory 
tone. The incident thus served to highlight the threat of conflict, while also allowing Vučić to 
portray himself as a source of stability, which is indeed how the EU perceives him.63 
Furthermore, in 2018 Marko Đurić, head of the Serbian government’s Kosovo office, was 
arrested by the Kosovo police due to his illegal entry in the former Serbian province. As Kosovo 
authorities explained, Đurić had been earlier banned from entering Kosovo.64 In the aftermath 
of the incident, Vučić used excessively inflammatory language by calling the Kosovo police a 
“terrorist gang” and defining Kosovo a ‘bandit’ country: he blamed also the EU and specifically 
said that the Brussels Agreement had been undermined.65
Another way to implement these kind of diversions regards the exploitation of genuine 
crises, which may contribute to persuade EDP actors to limit democratizing pressures. The 
migration crisis erupted in the 2010s constitutes a clear example. In September 2015, during 
the height of the European migration crisis, Vučić commented on the EU’s and Serbia’s role in 
managing the influx of asylum-seekers, stressing how Serbia adopted a more humanitarian 
approach if compared with other EU states, and declaring that he was willing to receive 
migrants even if Serbia was not yet an EU member state: ‘This makes us more European than 
some Member States. We don’t build walls.’66 We should not consider this approach as plain 
humanism deprived of political interests. On one hand, Serbia had an easier task: the refugees 
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entering its territory usually had the only goal to leave it as soon as possible. On the other hand, 
this approach, especially if compared with the fences built by Hungary (an EU member state) 
on the Serbian border, strengthened Vučić’s image as stability provider, achieving political 
points with the EU also in terms of Serbia’s accession process.This kind of diversionary 
behaviour helped the new Serbian elite to divert the EU attention from its inaction regarding 
necessary democratic reforms in areas such as the rule of law and media freedoms,67 persuading 
them to focus more on security issues and, at the same time, establishing themselves as the best 
security providers on the ground.68 This conclusion is shared by both EU and domestic actors: 
for example, an official of the European External Action Service interviewed in November 
201769 acknowledged that the desire to resolve the disputed status of Kosovo persuaded EU and 
member state officials to play along, disregarding Serbia’s problematic rule of law record for 
the sake of progress in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina; at the domestic level, 
Vukašin Obradović, President of the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS), 
in 2016 argued that ‘EU officials have a quite tolerant attitude towards Aleksandar Vučić and 
the way that he treats the media. This is because EU officials are not interested in the media so 
long as Vučić fulfils his main political tasks relating to the Kosovo agreement, regional stability 
and other strategic issues.’70 In fact, despite serious concerns regarding media freedom in Serbia 
expressed by NGOs and international organizations, in 2015 the EU Commissioner for 
European enlargement Johannes Hahn questioned the validity of claims about self-censorship 
and media freedom issues, demanding to focus more on real evidence than rumours.71 
Moreover, several European leaders have provided support and legitimation to Vučić, some of 
them being very clear about their motivations. For example, in 2016 the Austrian Chancellor, 
Sebastian Kurz, described him as an ‘anchor of stability.’72 Angela Merkel met with the Serbian 
leader ten times in three years, even in crucial moments:73 just few weeks before the 2017 
presidential elections she conceded to Vučić a meeting in Berlin,74 which was recognised by 
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Vučić himself who, after the victory, thanked Merkel for meeting him so close to the elections;75 
only days before the publication of the EU’s 2018 rather critical report on Serbia’s progress 
towards EU accession, Merkel praised Vučić’s ‘very good reform record’ in a joint press 
conference.76 During his visit to Serbia in April 2018, the European Council President Tusk 
hailed Vučić as a ‘soul mate’ and ‘strong patriot.’77 Finally, despite his growingly evident 
authoritarian tendencies Vučić has been rewarded with the opening of numerous chapters in the 
EU negotiation process, which were used to strengthen his domestic legitimation and his grip 
on power.78
The second diversionary behaviour that helped Serbian elites to emphasize artificially 
security issues, contributing to divert EU’s attention from democracy erosion, regards the 
‘instrumentalization of black knights.’79 Despite China is gaining relevance in this respect,80 
relations with Russia represent the key example. Several factors demonstrate that Serbia-Russia 
relations have recently intensified, due also to the Russian interest in preventing NATO/EU 
expansions in the Balkans. Shared Slav and Orthodox roots between the two countries,81 the 
Serbian anti-NATO sentiment82 and Moscow’s opposition to the independence of Kosovo83 
facilitated this intensified relation. Serbian elites cultivated their relationship with Russia in 
several ways: in 2013 Serbia accepted an emergency loan from Russia, and another for the 
renovation of the railways;84 the purchase by Gazprom of the refinery in Nis was favoured;85 
Belgrade refused to implement the European sanctions against Russia for the illegal annexation 
of Crimea;86 six second-hand Mig 29s and other military equipment were donated by Moscow 
in 2017;87 joint military exercises with Russia and Belarus were held since 2015; Serbia always 
refused to join NATO, preferring to remain military neutral; its leaders (i.e. Vučić, Dačić) made 
regular visits to Moscow; etc. 
It is important not to overestimate this intensification of linkages between Serbia and 
Russia, since they do not reach the needed magnitude to exert the functions foreseen by L&W 
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(Russian’s aid remains below 1% of GDP and is by far less consistent than that provided by the 
EU) and Tolstrup (linkages with the EU have been strengthened): to this day, just as one 
example, the EU buys ten times as many Serbian exports as Russia does, and Vučić is well 
aware of that.88 However, it seems that this new dynamism in Moscow-Belgrade relations was 
sufficient to allow the new Serbian elite to exploit it in its relationship with the EU. In fact, this 
issue and the migration crisis are the main reasons behind the ‘Berlin Process’ launched by 
Merkel in 2014.89 This diplomatic effort, which consisted in the organization of one 
international meeting every year, had the general goal to re-engage the EU in the Balkans, 
without dealing, however, with any democracy issue in countries like Serbia. Moreover, in 2017 
the French President Macron declared that the EU should ‘open up to the countries of the 
Balkans … it is a condition for them not to turn their backs on Europe and move either towards 
Russia or Turkey or towards authoritarian powers which do not defend our values.’90 It is, then, 
possible to agree with Bieber91 when he claims that Serbian ties to Russia are instrumentalized 
by Belgrade to keep the EU to focus on geopolitical stability and adopt a more lenient approach 
on democratic reforms.
I finally touch upon the conditions that may have helped diversionary behaviours to 
influence EDP effectiveness in Serbia during the last decade. Three factors,  and related 
provisional hypotheses, have been identified: starting conditions, type and strength of domestic 
elites, and weakness of EDP actors. All of them are present and significant in the Serbian case. 
As stressed above, there were solid bases on which the Serbian elite could build its diversionary 
behaviours: the Yugoslav wars fought between 1991 and 1995; the 1999 Kosovo war; the 
ethnic/religious/historical linkages between Serbia and Russia. In fact, the crisis management 
diversion during the 2010s was built mainly around the Kosovo issue and, despite an increased 
activism of Turkey and China in the Balkans, the instrumentalization of black knight diversion 
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was centred on Serbia-Russia relations: both of them were evaluated as credible security issues 
by EU actors, which implemented a less effective EDP also because of these issues.
The second factor regarding the type and strength of domestic actors was also present 
and relevant. We saw how the SNS became soon the dominant actor of the system, winning 
several consecutive elections with large margins. Moreover, Vučić and the SNS can be 
classified as instrumental democrats: while they pragmatically moderated the extremist views 
of the SRS, adopting a formal pro-EU platform, their Euroenthusiasm was instrumental, ‘the 
result of electoral tactics to come to power, secure political future and obtain “European 
legitimacy.”’92 These factors proved to be effective in helping Vučić to acquire the EU 
legitimacy described above: his dominant position, which left no alternatives on the ground, 
and his instrumental approach, which allowed him to mix contradictory moves in terms of 
security/stability and democratization, led EDP actors to accept him as the only possible 
interlocutor, increasing the credibility and effectiveness of his diversionary strategies.93
Finally, we can also stress the presence of the third factor related to the possible 
weakness of EDP actors. As we have briefly described above, during the 2000s the EU was 
effective in keeping Serbia on a democratic path while also managing to show strength in 
dealing with security issues (compliance with the ICTY demands). During the 2010s, the 
consequences of several crises emerged powerfully: the ‘Euro’ crisis, the enlargement fatigue, 
the migration crisis, the rise of illiberal regimes within the EU, etc. These factors worked well 
to weaken the EU and its credibility in pursuing some of the goals directly involving Serbia, as 
the enlargement program and the oversight of the democratization process. In this situation, the 
effectiveness of Serbian diversions may have been enhanced by the EU unwillingness to deal 
with yet another crisis in the Balkans, whether in the form of inter-ethnic conflicts or of a greater 
Russian influence in the region.
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In conclusion, the provisional hypotheses seem to hold at least of the Serbian case since 
the presence of strong instrumental democrats represented by Vučić and the SNS, which could 
build upon objective security issues as the history of inter-ethnic violence and the special 
relationship with Russia, and had the chance to deal with a weakened EU, may constitute the 
major factors explaining the capacity of diversionary behaviours to influence EDP effectiveness 
in the Serbian case.
Conclusion
The goal of this article was to engage in the debate on the determinants of EDP effectiveness, 
dealing with agency/structure and domestic/international divides, and focusing on the major 
shortcoming present in this literature which is the little consideration for the active role of 
domestic actors in these processes. Hence, I focused on L&W’s linkage and leverage theory, 
which represents one of the most promising attempts to bridge these divides, following also 
Tolstrup’s intuition according to which bringing agency back into this framework would 
increase its capacity to explain EDP effectiveness. Borrowing a concept elaborated in the field 
of international relations, I tried to build upon L&W and Tolstrup focusing on domestic actors’ 
diversionary behaviours thanks to which they may succeed in exerting a significant influence 
on leverage and, consequently, on EDP effectiveness.
The empirical analysis has shown these kinds of diversionary mechanisms at work in a 
case that neither L&W nor Tolstrup could explain satisfactorily. In fact, adopting the latter’s 
perspective we could have expected to see the new Serbian elite trying to reduce its linkages 
with the EU to limit the capacity of this external actor to hold them accountable for their 
authoritarian attitude. Instead, and counterintuitively, the new Serbian elite worked hard to gain 
EU’s support and legitimation through an active involvement in the normalization of relations 
with Kosovo and pushing forward Serbia’s integration process. Diversionary behaviours have 
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represented a key tool for domestic actors to manage this paradox, since these strategies allowed 
them to gain the benefits of a stronger relation with the EU without paying the price of greater 
accountability: diverting external actors’ attention from democracy to security issues allowed 
Vučić to simultaneously reduce EU democratizing pressures and trigger the autocratization 
process. As a result, the EU found itself in the paradoxical position of officially supporting both 
democracy promotion and anti-democratic actors in an EU candidate country.
With regard to L&W, if they acknowledge that particularly strong factors in the leverage 
dimension may prevent an effective EDP even in presence of other favourable conditions like 
a high linkage, they highlight that these factors are influenced preponderantly by structural 
causes. In fact, according to them the presence of competing foreign-policy objectives is 
explained by the economic/strategic relevance of the target state. The Serbian case 
demonstrated that diversionary behaviours might have a significant influence on external 
actors’ perceptions and interests, leading them to overemphasize security issues that are not 
fully justified by the actual situation on the ground. Hence, domestic elites may manipulate the 
way structural factors are evaluated by external actors: through these strategies, then, they may 
succeed in persuading international actors to reduce their democratizing pressures and, 
consequently, to decrease leverage to a level that produce a negative impact on EDP 
effectiveness. 
In conclusion, domestic elites’ diversionary behaviour represent a significant factor 
worth of being integrated in L&W’s framework since, as Tolstrup’s concept of gatekeeping 
elites, it enlarges its capacity to explain intra-regional differences in EDP effectiveness and it 
strengthens its overall explanatory power.
Some further considerations are due. First, these findings support the claim that local 
agency deserves greater attention in EDP processes: without both local and international actors 
pushing toward the same direction EDP can hardly be effective. Second, future researches 
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should also focus on those factors able to affect diversions’ capacity to manipulate the leverage 
dimension and impact on EDP effectiveness. Finally, what emerges from the Serbian 
experience, which strengthens a pessimistic perspective about the future of democracy, is an 
intended/induced shift in the policy preferences of international democracy promoters, which 
are increasingly privileging security issues to democratization even in unexpected cases, 
making these actors less and less effective in dealing with the phenomenon of democratic 
backsliding. 
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Figure 1. How domestic elites can influence EDP effectiveness in the linkage and leverage theory 
Source: Author’s elaboration on the ground of a Tolstrup’s figure (2013, 721).
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Figure 2. Regime of the World Index, with lower and upper bound categories. Serbia 1990-2018
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Table 1. How variation in linkage and leverage shapes external pressure for democratization
High Linkage Low Linkage
High Leverage Consistent and intense 
democratizing pressure
Often strong, but intermittent and 
“electoralist,” pressure
Low Leverage Consistent but diffuse and 
indirect democratizing pressure
Weak external pressure
Source: Levitsky and Way (2010: 53).
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Table 2. Levitsky and Way’s measurement of Western leverage
Low leverage Cases that meet at least one of the following criteria:
 Large Economy
 Major Oil Producer
 Possession of/capacity to use nuclear weapons
Medium leverage Cases that meet none of the criteria for low leverage but meet at least one of 
the following criteria:
 Medium-Sized Economy
 Secondary Oil Producer
 Competing Security Issues
 Beneficiary of Black Knight Assistance
High leverage Cases that meet none of the criteria for low or medium leverage
Source: Levitsky and Way (2010, 372-373).
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